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Abstract
Colorado conducted risk-limiting tabulation audits (RLAs) across
the state in 2017, including both ballot-level comparison audits and
ballot-polling audits. Those audits only covered contests restricted to
a single county; methods to efficiently audit contests that cross county
boundaries and combine ballot polling and ballot-level comparisons
have not been available.
Colorado’s current audit software (RLATool) needs to be improved
to audit these contests that cross county lines and to audit small
contests efficiently.
This paper addresses these needs. It presents extremely simple but
inefficient methods, more efficient methods that combine ballot polling
and ballot-level comparisons using stratified samples, and methods
that combine ballot-level comparison and variable-size batch compar-
ison audits in a way that does not require stratified sampling.
We conclude with some recommendations, and illustrate our rec-
ommended method using examples that compare them to existing ap-
proaches. Exemplar open-source code and interactive Jupyter note-
books are provided that implement the methods and allow further
exploration.
Acknowledgements. We are grateful to Ronald L. Rivest for helpful con-
versations and suggestions.
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1 Introduction
A risk-limiting audit (RLA) of an election is a procedure that has a known,
pre-specified minimum chance of correcting the electoral outcome if the out-
come is incorrect—that is, if the reported outcome differs from the outcome
that a full manual tabulation of the votes would find. RLAs require a durable,
voter-verifiable record of voter intent, such as paper ballots, and they assume
that this audit trail is sufficiently complete and accurate that a full hand tally
would show the true electoral outcome. That assumption is not automati-
cally satisfied: a compliance audit (Stark and Wagner, 2012) is required.
Risk-limiting audits are generally incremental: they examine more bal-
lots, or batches of ballots, until either (i) there is strong statistical evidence
that a full hand tabulation would confirm the outcome, or (ii) the audit has
led to a full hand tabulation, the result of which should become the official
result.
RLAs have been piloted in California, Colorado, and Ohio, and a test
of RLA procedures has been conducted in Arizona. RLA bills are being
drafted or are already under consideration in California, Virginia, Washing-
ton, and other states. A number of laws have either allowed or mandated risk-
limiting audits, including California AB 2023 (Saldan˜a), SB 360 (Padilla),
and AB 44 (Mullin); Rhode Island SB 413A and HB 5704A; and Colorado
Revised Statutes (CRS) 1-7-515.
CRS 1-7-515 required Colorado to implement risk-limiting audits begin-
ning in 2017. (There are provisions to allow the Secretary of State to exempt
some counties.) The first set of coordinated risk-limiting election audits
across the state took place in Colorado in November, 2017.1
Colorado’s “uniform voting system” program2 led many Colorado coun-
ties to purchase (or to plan to purchase) voting systems that are auditable
at the ballot level: those systems export cast vote records (CVRs) for indi-
vidual ballots in a manner that allows the corresponding paper ballot to be
identified, and conversely, make it possible to find the CVR corresponding to
any particular paper ballot. We call counties that have such systems “CVR”
counties. It is estimated that by June, 2018, 98.2% of active Colorado voters
will be in CVR counties. CVR counties can perform “ballot-level comparison
1See https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/RLA/2017RLABackground.ht
ml
2https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/VotingSystems/UniformVoting
System.html
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audits,” (Lindeman and Stark, 2012) which are currently the most efficient
approach to risk-limiting audits in that they require examining fewer ballots
than other methods do, when the outcome of the contest under audit is in
fact correct.
Other counties (“legacy” or “no-CVR” counties) have systems that do
not allow auditors to check how the system interpreted voter intent for in-
dividual ballots. Their election results can still be audited, provided their
voting systems create a voter-verifiable paper trail (e.g., voter-marked paper
ballots) that is conserved to ensure that it remains accurate and intact, and
organized well enough to permit ballots to be selected at random. Pilot au-
dits in California suggest that the most efficient way to audit such systems
is by “ballot-polling” (Lindeman et al., 2012; Lindeman and Stark, 2012) (in
contrast to “batch-level comparisons,” for example).
There is currently no literature on how to perform risk-limiting audits
of contests that include CVR counties and no-CVR counties by combining
ballot polling and ballot-level comparisons. Existing methods would either
require all counties to use the lowest common denominator, ballot-polling
(which does not take advantage of the CVRs, and thus is expected to require
more auditing than a method that does take advantage of the CVRs), or
would require no-CVR counties to perform batch-level comparisons, which
were found in California to be (generally) less efficient than ballot-polling
audits.3
The open-source audit software used for Colorado’s 2017 audits, RLATool
(https://github.com/FreeAndFair/ColoradoRLA/), needs to be improved
to audit contests that cross county lines and to audit small contests efficiently.
First, the current version (1.1.0) of RLATool needs to be modified to
recognize and group together contests that cross jurisdictional boundaries;
currently, it treats every contest as if it were entirely contained in a single
county. Margins and risk limits apply to entire contests, not to the portion of
a contest included in a county. RLATool also does not allow the user to select
the sample size, nor does it directly allow an unstratified random sample to
be drawn across counties. Second, to audit a contest that includes voters in
“legacy” counties (counties with voting systems that cannot export cast vote
records) and voters in counties with newer systems, new statistical methods
are needed to keep the efficiency of ballot-level comparison audits that the
3See Rivest (2018) for a different (Bayesian) approach to auditing contests that include
both CVR counties and no-CVR counties.
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newer systems afford. Third, auditing contests that appear only on a subset
of ballots can be made much more efficient if the sample can be drawn from
just those ballots that contain the contest. While allowing samples to be
restricted to ballots reported to contain a particular contest is not essential
in the short run, it will be necessary eventually to make it feasible to audit
smaller contests.
This document focuses on near-term requirements for risk-limiting audits
in Colorado. Section 2 presents a number of crude approaches that could be
implemented easily but might require examining substantially more ballots.
Section 3 presents an approach based on comparison audits with different
batch sizes. This approach is statistically elegant and relatively efficient,
but might require changing how counties handle their ballots. Section 4
presents our recommended approach, which combines ballot-level compar-
isons in counties that can perform them with ballot-polling in the no-CVR
counties. All the approaches require new software, including at least mi-
nor modifications to RLATool. We provide example software implementing
the risk calculations for our recommended approach as a Python Jupyter
notebook.4 Section 5 describes how audit efficiency could be improved in
CVR counties by combining CVR data with data from Colorado’s voter
registration system, SCORE.5 Sections 6 and 7 explain the recommended
modifications to ballot-level comparison and ballot-polling audits, respec-
tively. Section 8 summarizes our recommendations and considerations for
implementation.
1.1 Priorities for Colorado audits
Auditing efficiency is controlled in part by how well the audit can limit the
sample to ballots that contain the contests under audit. Some contests are
on (essentially) every ballot, for instance the governor’s race. Others, such
as mayoral contests, may appear on only a small fraction of ballots cast in
a county. Partisan primaries—even for statewide office—are somewhere in
between, because in general no single party’s primary appears on every ballot
cast in the state. Thus, either we accept reduced efficiency for the sake of
simplicity by continuing to sample ballots uniformly from within counties
(or collections of counties), or we develop a way to focus the auditing on the
4See https://github.com/pbstark/CORLA18.
5SCORE is Colorado’s voter registration system, which also tracks who voted. See ht
tps://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/SCORE/SCOREhome.html.
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ballots that contain the contest. The latter requires external information,
e.g., from SCORE, as discussed below.
Moreover, party primaries for statewide offices (and perhaps other con-
tests) will include CVR counties and no-CVR counties, so we need a method
to audit across both kinds of voting technology.
This report addresses both issues, providing options for effectively audit-
ing heterogeneous voting technology, varying in efficiency, complexity, and
on whom any additional audit burden falls.
2 Crude (and unpleasant) approaches
Here and generally throughout the paper, we discuss auditing a single contest
at a time, although the same sample can be used to audit more than one con-
test and there are ways of combining audits of different contests into a single
process (Stark, 2009b, 2010). We use terminology drawn from a number of
papers; the key reference is Lindeman and Stark (2012). An overstatement
error is an error that caused the margin between any reported winner and
any reported loser to appear larger than it really was. An understatement
error is an error that caused the margin between every reported winner and
every reported loser to appear to be smaller than it really was.
2.1 Hand count the legacy counties
The simplest approach to combining legacy counties with CVR counties is
to require every legacy county to do a full hand count of the primaries,
and to conduct a ballot-level comparison audit in CVR counties, based on
contest margins adjusted for the results of the manual tallies in the CVR
counties. For instance, imagine a contest with two candidates, reported
winner w and reported loser ℓ. Suppose the total number of reported votes
for candidate w is Vw and the total for candidate ℓ is Vℓ, so that Vw >
Vℓ, since w is the reported winner. Suppose that a full manual tally of
the votes in the legacy counties shows V ′w votes for w and V
′
ℓ votes for ℓ.
Suppose that a total of N ballots were cast in the CVR counties. Then the
diluted margin for the comparison audit in the CVR counties is defined to be
[(Vw−V
′
w)− (Vℓ−V
′
ℓ )]/N . Requiring a full hand count in the legacy counties
has obvious disadvantages, except perhaps in very close contests where ballot
polling is not efficient. (But it does have the advantage of not forcing CVR
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counties to do additional auditing to compensate for the legacy counties.)
2.2 Subtract error bounds for the legacy counties from
vote totals
If ballot accounting and SCORE data can provide good upper bounds on the
number of ballots cast in each contest in legacy counties, there are simple
upper bounds on the total possible overstatement error each legacy county
could contribute to the overall contest results; those can be subtracted from
the overall margin (as in the previous subsection) and the remainder of the
contests can be audited in CVR counties against the adjusted margins. For
instance, consider a primary that appears on N ballots in a legacy counties.
Suppose that in legacy counties, the overall, statewide contest winner, w, is
reported to have received V ′w votes, and some loser, ℓ, is reported to have re-
ceived V ′ℓ votes. (Note that V
′
ℓ could be greater than V
′
w: w is not necessarily
the reported winner in the legacy counties.) Then the most overstatement
error that the county could possibly have in determining whether w in fact
beat ℓ is if every reported undervote, invalid vote, or vote for a different
candidate, t, had in fact been a vote for ℓ (producing a 1-vote overstate-
ment), and every vote reported for w was in fact a vote for ℓ (producing a
2-vote overstatement). The reduction in the margin that would produce is
N − V ′w − V
′
ℓ + 2V
′
w = N + V
′
w − V
′
ℓ votes.
Whereas the previous approach places the auditing burden created by
obsolescent equipment entirely on the legacy counties, this approach places
it entirely upon the CVR counties. Also, in a close contest, it could require
a full hand count in every county that might not otherwise be necessary.
2.3 Treat legacy counties as if every ballot selected
from them for audit has a two-vote overstatement
A third simple-but-pessimistic approach is to sample uniformly from all coun-
ties as if one were performing a ballot-level comparison audit everywhere, but
to treat any ballot selected from a legacy county as a two-vote overstatement.
This approach has the same disadvantages as the previous approach.
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3 Variable batch sizes
Another approach is to perform a comparison audit across all counties, but to
use batches consisting of more than one ballot (batch-level comparisons) in
legacy counties and batches consisting of a single ballot (ballot-level compar-
isons) in CVR counties.6 This requires that the no-CVR counties report vote
subtotals for physically identifiable batches. If a county’s voting system can
only report subtotals by precinct but the county does not sort paper ballots
by precinct, this approach might require revising how the county handles its
paper; we understand that this is the case in many Colorado counties.
That said, many California counties that do not sort vote-by-mail (VBM)
ballots by precinct conduct the statutory 1% audits by manually retrieving
the ballots for just those precincts selected for audit from whatever physical
batches they happen to be in: the situation is identical to that in Colorado.
Another solution is the “Boulder-style” batch-level audit,7 which requires
generating vote subtotals after each physical batch is scanned, and exporting
those subtotals in machine-readable form. That in turn may require using ex-
tra memory cards, repeatedly initializing and deleting tabulation databases,
or other measures that add complexity and opportunity for human error.
While those two approaches are laborious, they would provide a viable
short-term solution, especially combined with information from SCORE to
check that the reported batch-level results contain the correct number of
ballots for each contest under audit. Moreover, it does not unduly increase
the workload in CVR counties to compensate for legacy equipment.
This kind of variable-batch-size comparison audit approach would require
modifying or augmenting RLATool in several ways:
1. The CVR reporting tool would need to be modified to allow no-CVR
counties to report batch-level results in a manner analogous to how
CVR counties report ballot-level results, or an external tool would need
to be provided.
2. The sampling algorithm would have to allow sampling batches—and
sampling them with unequal probability, because efficient batch-level
6For majority and plurality elections, including those in which voters can select more
than one candidate, audits can be based on overstatement and understatement errors at
the level of batches.
7See http://bcn.boulder.co.us/~neal/elections/boulder-audit-10-11/.
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audits involve sampling batches with probability proportional to a
bound on the possible overstatement error in the batch. It would also
need to calculate the appropriate sampling probability for each batch
(of whatever size). Again, this could be accommodated using an exter-
nal tool to draw the sample from legacy counties.
3. The risk calculations would need to be modified. This, too, could
be done with external software, with suitable provisions for capturing
audit data from RLATool or directly from legacy counties.
None of these changes is enormous; the mathematics and statistics are
already worked out in published papers, and there is exemplar code for cal-
culating the batch-level error bounds, drawing the samples with probability
proportional to an error bound, and calculating the attained risk from the
sample results. Indeed, this is the method that was used in several of Cali-
fornia’s pilot audits, including the audit in Orange County. A derivation of
a method for comparison audits with variable batch sizes is given below in
section 6.
4 Stratified “hybrid” audits
Other approaches involve stratification: partitioning the cast ballots into
non-overlapping groups and sampling independently from those groups. One
could stratify by county, but in general it is simpler and more efficient sta-
tistically (i.e., results in auditing fewer ballots) to minimize the number of
strata. We consider methods that use two strata: CVR counties and no-CVR
counties. Collectively, the ballots cast in CVR counties comprise one stra-
tum and the ballots cast in legacy counties comprise a second stratum; every
ballot cast in the contest is in exactly one of the two strata. We assume that
the samples are drawn from the two strata independently.
As explained below, these stratified “hybrid” audits require the specifica-
tion of some additional parameters: λ1 for dividing the tolerable overstate-
ment error up, and the strata risk limits {αs}.
8
4.1 Partitioning the total permissible overstatement
into strata
The simplest approach to stratification involves partitioning the risk limit
and the tolerable overstatement error of the tabulation into two pieces, one
for the (pooled) CVR counties and one for the (pooled) no-CVR counties.
Let Vwℓ > 0 denote the contest-wide margin (in votes) of reported winner
w over reported loser ℓ. Let Vwℓ,s denote the margin (in votes) of reported
winner w over reported loser ℓ in stratum s. Note that Vwℓ,s might be negative
in one stratum. Let Awℓ denote the margin (in votes) of reported winner w
over reported loser ℓ that a full hand count of the entire contest would show,
that is, the actual margin rather than the reported margin. Reported winner
w really beat reported loser ℓ if and only if Awℓ > 0. Define Awℓ,s to be the
actual margin (in votes) of w over ℓ in stratum s; this too may be negative.
Let ωwℓ,s ≡ Vwℓ,s − Awℓ,s be the overstatement of the margin of w over ℓ
in stratum s. Reported winner w really beat reported loser ℓ if and only if
ωwℓ ≡ ωwℓ,1 + ωwℓ,2 < Vwℓ.
Pick λ1 ∈ ℜ and define λ2 = 1 − λ1. These values partition the total
tolerable overstatement between the two strata: If ωwℓ,1 < λ1Vwℓ and ωwℓ,2 <
λ2Vwℓ, candidate w really received more votes than candidate ℓ. Some (λ1, λ2)
pairs can be ruled out a priori, because (for instance) ωwℓ,s ∈ [−2Ns, 2Ns],
where Ns is the number of ballots cast in stratum s. There are other simple,
sharper bounds, sketched below.
The choice of λ1 (which determines the tolerable overstatement in each
stratum), the strata risk limits {αs}, and details of the audit procedures affect
the workload and the overall risk limit. (See section 4.1.1 and section 8.)
For ballot-level comparison audits, auditing to ensure that ωwℓ,s < λsVwℓ
is discussed in section 6. It is a minor modification of the method embodied
in RLATool.
For ballot-polling audits, auditing to ensure that ωwℓ,s < λsVwℓ is dis-
cussed in section 7. Note that this requires a more substantial modification
of the standard ballot-polling calculations, because the standard calculations
consider only the fraction of ballots with a vote for either w or ℓ that contain
a vote for w, while we need to make an inference about the difference between
the number of votes for w and the number of votes for ℓ. This introduces
an additional unknown nuisance parameter, the number of ballots with votes
for either w or ℓ.
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4.1.1 Combining stratum-level risk limits
We audit to test the two hypotheses {ωwℓ,s ≥ λsVwℓ}
2
s=1, independently for
the two strata. If we reject both hypotheses, we conclude that the contest
outcome is correct; otherwise, we manually re-tabulate the contest in one
or both strata, depending on the audit rules. Those rules matter: the two
audits might need to be conducted to smaller risk limits individually than
the desired risk limit for the contest as a whole.
Recall that the samples are drawn independently from the two strata.
Pick α1, α2 ∈ (0, α). (Below we discuss the choice further.) We audit each
stratum s to test the hypothesis ωwℓ,s ≥ λsVwℓ (the overstatement exceeds
the tolerable overstatement) at risk limit αs, as if it were its own election.
The audits can be conducted at the same time or sequentially; there is no
coordination between the audits unless one of them leads to a full hand count
but the other does not: see below.
How do these two stratum-level “risk limits” α1 and α2 determine the
overall risk that the audit will not correct the outcome if the outcome is
wrong? The overall risk depends on the rule for what we do if the audit in
one stratum leads to a full manual tally of that stratum.
Here are the possibilities. Bear in mind that for the outcome to be wrong,
at least one stratum must have a net overstatement greater its tolerable over-
statement: That is, if ωwℓ,1+ωwℓ,2 ≥ Vwℓ, then ωwℓ,1 ≥ λ1Vwℓ or ωwℓ,2 ≥ λ2Vwℓ,
or both. If the tolerable overstatement is exceeded in only one stratum,
h, then the chance that the stratum will be fully hand counted is at least
1− αh ≥ 1− α.
If both ωwℓ,1 ≥ λ1Vwℓ and ωwℓ,2 ≥ λ2Vwℓ, then the chance both are com-
pletely tabulated by hand is at least (1−α1)(1−α2), since the audit samples
in the two strata are independent.
What should we do if the audit leads to a full tally in one stratum, h,
that reveals that indeed its tolerable overstatement has been exceeded, but
the other audit has not led to a full tabulation, because it has not started,
because it is still underway, or because it terminated without a full hand
tally? We consider two options. The simpler is to automatically require a
full hand count of the other stratum. If the audit uses this rule, then we can
take α1 = α2 = α, and the procedure will have risk limit α. However, this
rule creates the possibility of requiring a full hand count in circumstances
where it may seem substantively superfluous. For instance, one can imagine
an audit of a statewide contest in which the tolerable overstatement in no-
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CVR counties is exceeded, yet the outcome still could be verified without a
full hand count in the CVR counties.
The second approach is to adjust the tolerable overstatement in the other
stratum in light of the known manual tally Awℓ,h in the stratum h that has
been fully hand tallied: we will test against the threshold Vwℓ−Awℓ,h ≡ λ
′
tVwℓ,
rather than the original value λtVwℓ. (Because the overstatement in stratum
h exceeded the tolerable overstatement, the updated tolerable overstatement
in stratum t will be smaller than the original value.) Then to reject the new
null hypothesis in stratum t is to conclude that the overall outcome is correct.
If and when the hypothesis in stratum t changes, the audit in that stratum
might be able to stop on the basis of the data already observed; it might need
to continue; or—if it had stopped based on the original threshold λtVwℓ—it
might need to examine more ballots, possibly continuing to a full hand tally.
We will now show in detail that this rule allows the contest to be audited
at risk limit α by selecting values of α1 and α2 that sum to a bit more than α:
specifically, such that (1−α1)(1−α2) < 1−α. For instance, suppose we want
the overall risk limit to be 5%. If we use a risk limit of 4% in the no-CVR
stratum and a risk limit of 1.04% in the CVR stratum, the overall risk limit
is not larger than 1− (1− α1)(1− α2) ≡ 1− 0.96× 0.9896 < 0.05.
The statistical wrinkle is that adjusting for the manual tally in the hand-
counted stratum h changes the hypothesis being tested in the other stratum
t in a way that is itself random: whether the original null ωwℓ,s ≥ λtVwℓ is
tested or the new null ωwℓ,s ≥ λ
′
tVwℓ is tested depends on what the sample
reveals in stratum h. If the hypothesis does change, there is only one value
possible for λ′t—which depends on the reported margin Vwℓ and the count
Awℓ,h in stratum h—but λ
′
t is unknown until Awℓ,h is known.
We assume that before any data are collected, the audit specifies two
families of tests: for each stratum s, a family of level-αs tests of the null
hypothesis that the overstatement in the stratum is greater than or equal to
c, for all feasible values of c. That is,
Pr{reject hypothesis that ωwℓ,s ≥ cs||ωwℓ,s ≥ cs} ≤ αs, (1)
for s = 1, 2, and all feasible cs. Moreover, we insist that the test depend on
data only from ballots selected from its stratum. Because the samples in the
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two strata are independent, for all feasible pairs c1, c2,
Pr{reject neither hypothesis ωwℓ,s ≥ cs, s = 1, 2||ωwℓ,s ≥ cs for both s = 1, 2}
=
2∏
s=1
1− Pr{reject hypothesis that ωwℓ,s ≥ cs||ωwℓ,s ≥ cs}
≥ (1− α1)(1− α2). (2)
What is the chance that the audit leads to a full hand tabulation if the
outcome is incorrect? One way the audit can lead to a full hand tally is
if it leads to a full count in one stratum, the null hypothesis in the other
stratum is changed, and the audit in the second stratum then proceeds to a
full manual tally. (There are other ways the audit can lead to a full hand
tally, for instance, if neither null hypothesis is rejected, but this is one way.)
If the outcome is wrong, there is at least one stratum in which the over-
statement ωwℓ,s exceeds the threshold λsVwℓ. Let h be one such stratum.
Then the chance the audit in stratum h leads to a full manual tally in that
stratum is at least (1 − αh). If the audit leads to a full manual tally in
stratum h and the overall outcome is wrong, then the (new) null hypothe-
sis in the other stratum, t, must be true. If we started to audit that new
hypothesis ab initio, the chance that we would reject it would be at most
αt, so the chance the audit would lead to a full hand count of stratum t is
at least 1− αt. The question is whether “changing hypotheses” could make
that chance smaller. The inequality 2 shows that it cannot: for any feasible
pair of overstatements, c = (c1, c2), if ωwℓ,1 ≥ c1 and ωwℓ,2 ≥ c2, the chance
that neither the hypothesis ωwℓ,1 ≥ c1 nor the hypothesis ωwℓ,2 ≥ c2 will be
rejected is at least (1− α1)(1− α2).
And therefore, for this procedure, the chance that there will be a full
hand count in both strata is at least (1 − α1)(1 − α2) if the outcome is
incorrect, even if the probability were zero that both of the original audits
would proceed to a full hand count. The overall risk limit is thus not larger
than 1− (1− α1)(1− α2) .
4.2 Constraining the total overstatement across strata
A more statistically efficient approach to ensuring that the overstatement
error in the two strata does not exceed the margin is to try to constrain the
sum of the overstatement errors in the two strata, rather than constrain the
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pieces separately: there are many ways that the total overstatement could be
less than Vwℓ without having the overstatement ωwℓ,s in stratum s less than
λsVwℓ, s = 1, 2. To that end, imagine all values λ1. If, for all such pairs, we
can reject the hypothesis that the overstatement error in stratum 1 is greater
than or equal to λ1Vwℓ and the overstatement error in stratum 2 is greater
than or equal to λ2Vwℓ, then we can conclude that the outcome is correct.
To test the conjunction hypothesis (i.e., that both of those null hypotheses
are false), we use Fisher’s combining function. Let ps(λ) be the p-value of
the hypothesis ωwℓ,s ≥ λVwℓ. If the null hypothesis that ωwℓ,1 ≥ λ1Vwℓ and
ωwℓ,2 ≥ λ2Vwℓ is true, then the combination
χ(λ1, λ2) = −2
2∑
s=1
ln ps(λs) (3)
has a probability distribution that is dominated by the chi-square distribution
with 4 degrees of freedom.8
Hence, if, for all λ1 and λ2 = 1 − λ1, the combined statistic χ(λ1, λ2) is
greater than the 1− α quantile of the chi-square distribution with 4 degrees
of freedom, the audit can stop.
The calculation of ps(λ) uses the procedures discussed in sections 6 and 7.
5 Sampling from subcollections
To audit contests that are contained on only a fraction of the ballots cast
in one or more counties efficiently requires the ability to sample from just
those ballots (or, at least, from a subset of all ballots that contains every
such ballot). Because the CVRs cannot be entirely trusted (otherwise, the
audit would be superfluous), we cannot rely on them to determine which
ballots contain a given contest. However, if we have independent knowledge
of the number of ballots that contain a given contest (e.g., from the SCORE
system), then there are methods that allow the sample to be drawn from
ballots whose CVRs contain the contest and still limit the risk rigorously.
See Benaloh et al. (2011) and Ban˜uelos and Stark (2012) for details.
8If the two tests had continuously distributed p-values, the distribution would be exactly
chi-square with four degrees of freedom, but if either p-value has atoms when the null
hypothesis is true, it is in general stochastically smaller. This follows from a coupling
argument along the lines of Theorem 4.12.3 in Grimmett and Stirzaker (2001).
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6 Batch comparison audits of a tolerable over-
statement in votes
In this section we expand previous comparison auditing work (already em-
bodied in RLATool) to handle two new requirements. The first allows the
specification of the λ parameters discussed in section 4. The second handles
batch-level auditing.
The first requirement requires that we consider auditing in a single stra-
tum to test whether the overstatement of any margin (in votes) exceeds some
fraction λ of the overall margin Vwℓ between reported winner w and reported
loser ℓ. If the stratum contains all the ballots cast in the contest, then for
λ = 1, this would confirm the election outcome. For stratified audits, we
might want to test other values of λ, as described above.
In Colorado, comparison audits have been ballot-level (i.e., batches con-
sisting of a single ballot). This section also addresses the second requirement
by deriving a method for batches of arbitrary size, which might be useful
for Colorado to audit contests that include CVR counties and legacy coun-
ties. We keep the a priori error bounds tighter than the “super-simple”
method (Stark, 2010). To keep the notation simpler, we consider only a sin-
gle contest, but the MACRO test statistic (Stark, 2009b, 2010) automatically
extends the result to auditing C > 1 contests simultaneously. The derivation
is for plurality contests, including “vote-for-k” plurality contests. Majority
and super-majority contests are a minor modification (Stark, 2008).9
6.1 Notation
• W: the set of reported winners of the contest
• L: the set of reported losers of the contest
• Ns ballots were cast in all in the stratum. (The contest might not
appear on all Ns ballots.)
• P “batches” of ballots are in stratum s. A batch contains one or more
ballots. Every ballot in stratum s is in exactly one batch.
9So are some forms of preferential and approval voting, such as Borda count, and
proportional representation contests, such as D’Hondt (Stark and Teague, 2014). Changes
for IRV/STV are more complicated.
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• np: number of ballots in batch p. Ns =
∑P
p=1 np.
• vpi ∈ {0, 1}: the reported votes for candidate i in batch p
• api ∈ {0, 1}: actual votes for candidate i in batch p. If the contest does
not appear on any ballot in batch p, then api = 0.
• Vwℓ,s ≡
∑P
p=1(vpw − vpℓ): Reported margin in stratum s of reported
winner w ∈ W over reported loser ℓ ∈ L, in votes.
• Vwℓ: Overall reported margin of reported winner w ∈ W over reported
loser ℓ ∈ L, in votes, for the entire contest (not just stratum s)
• V : smallest reported overall margin between any reported winner and
reported loser: V ≡ minw∈W ,ℓ∈L Vwℓ
• Awℓ,s ≡
∑P
p=1(apw − apℓ): actual margin in the stratum of reported
winner w ∈ W over reported loser ℓ ∈ L, in votes
• Awℓ: actual margin of reported winner w ∈ W over reported loser
ℓ ∈ L, in votes, for the entire contest (not just in stratum s)
6.2 Reduction to maximum relative overstatement
If the contest is entirely contained in stratum s, then the reported winners
of the contest are the actual winners if
min
w∈W ,ℓ∈L
Awℓ,s > 0.
Here, we address the case that the contest may include a portion outside the
stratum. To combine independent samples in different strata, it is convenient
to be able to test whether the net overstatement error in a stratum exceeds
a given threshold.
Instead of testing that condition directly, we will test a condition that is
sufficient but not necessary for the inequality to hold, to get a computation-
ally simple test that is still conservative (i.e., the risk is not larger than its
nominal value).
For every winner, loser pair (w, ℓ), we want to test whether the overstate-
ment error exceeds some threshold, generally one tied to the reported margin
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between w and ℓ. For instance, for a simple stratified audit, we might take
the threshold to be λsVwℓ.
We want to test whether
P∑
p=1
(vpw − apw − vpℓ + apℓ)/Vwℓ ≥ λs.
The maximum of sums is not larger than the sum of the maxima; that is,
max
w∈W ,ℓ∈L
P∑
p=1
(vpw−apw−vpℓ+apℓ)/Vwℓ ≤
P∑
p=1
max
w∈W ,ℓ∈L
(vpw−apw−vpℓ+apℓ)/Vwℓ.
Define
ep ≡ max
w∈Wℓ∈L
(vpw − apw − vpℓ + apℓ)/Vwℓ.
Then no reported margin is overstated by a fraction λs or more if
E ≡
P∑
p=1
ep < λs.
Thus if we can reject the hypothesis E ≥ λs, we can conclude that no
pairwise margin was overstated by as much as a fraction λs.
Testing whether E ≥ λs would require a very large sample if we knew
nothing at all about ep without auditing batch p: a single large value of ep
could make E arbitrarily large. But there is an a priori upper bound for
ep. Whatever the reported votes vpi are in batch p, we can find the potential
values of the actual votes api that would make the error ep largest, because
api must be between 0 and np, the number of ballots in batch p:
vpw − apw − vpℓ + apℓ
Vwℓ
≤
vpw − 0− vpℓ + np
Vwℓ
.
Hence,
ep ≤ max
w∈W ,ℓ∈L
vpw − vpℓ + np
Vwℓ
≡ up. (4)
Knowing that ep ≤ up might let us conclude reliably that E < λs by
examining only a small number of batches—depending on the values {up}
P
p=1
and on the values of {ep} for the audited batches.
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To make inferences about E, it is helpful to work with the taint tp ≡
ep
up
≤ 1. Define U ≡
∑P
p=1 up. Suppose we draw batches at random with
replacement, with probability up/U of drawing batch p in each draw, p =
1, . . . , P . (Since up ≥ 0, these are all positive numbers, and they sum to 1,
so they define a probability distribution on the P batches.)
Let Tj be the value of tp for the batch p selected in the jth draw. Then
{Tj}
n
j=1 are IID, P{Tj ≤ 1} = 1, and
ET1 =
P∑
p=1
up
U
tp =
1
U
P∑
p=1
up
ep
up
=
1
U
P∑
p=1
ep = E/U.
Thus E = UET1.
So, if we have strong evidence that ET1 < λs/U , we have strong evidence
that E < λs.
This approach can be simplified even further by noting that up has a
simple upper bound that does not depend on vpi. At worst, the reported
result for batch p shows np votes for the “least-winning” apparent winner of
the contest with the smallest margin, but a hand interpretation would show
that all np ballots in the batch had votes for the runner-up in that contest.
Since Vwℓ ≥ V and 0 ≤ vpi ≤ np,
up = max
w∈W ,ℓ∈L
vpw − vpℓ + np
Vwℓ
≤ max
w∈W ,ℓ∈L
np − 0 + np
Vwℓ
≤
2np
V
.
Thus if we use 2np/V in lieu of up, we still get conservative results. (We also
need to re-define U to be the sum of those upper bounds.) An intermediate,
still conservative approach would be to use this upper bound for batches
that consist of a single ballot, but use the sharper bound (4) when np > 1.
Regardless, for the new definition of up and U , {Tj}
n
j=1 are IID, P{Tj ≤ 1} =
1, and
ET1 =
P∑
p=1
up
U
tp =
1
U
P∑
p=1
up
ep
up
=
1
U
P∑
p=1
ep = E/U.
So, if we have evidence that ET1 < λs/U , we have evidence that E < λs.
6.3 Testing ET1 ≥ λs/U
To test whether ET1 < λs/U , there are a variety of methods available. One
particularly “clean” sequential method is based on Wald’s Sequential Prob-
ability Ratio Test (SPRT) (Wald (1945)). Harold Kaplan pointed out this
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method on a website that no longer exists. A derivation of this “Kaplan-
Wald” method is given in Stark and Teague (2014, Appendix A); to apply
the method here, take t = λs in their equation 18.
A different sequential method, the Kaplan-Markov method (also due to
Harold Kaplan), is given in Stark (2009a).
7 Ballot-polling audits of a tolerable over-
statement in votes
7.1 Conditional tri-hypergeometric test
We consider a single stratum s, containing Ns ballots. We will sample indi-
vidual ballots without replacement from stratum s. Of the Ns ballots, Aw,s
have a vote for w but not for ℓ, Aℓ,s have a vote for ℓ but not for w, and
Au,s = Ns − Nw,s − Nℓ,s have votes for both w and ℓ or neither w nor ℓ,
including undervotes and invalid ballots. We might draw a simple random
sample of n ballots (n fixed ahead of time), or we might draw sequentially
without replacement, so the sample size B could be random. For instance,
the rule for determining B could depend on the data.10
Regardless, we assume that, conditional on the attained sample size n,
the ballots are a simple random sample of size n from the Ns ballots in
the population. In the sample, Bw ballots contain a vote for w but not ℓ,
with Bℓ and Bu defined analogously. Then, conditional on B = n, the joint
distribution of (Bw, Bℓ, Bu) is tri-hypergeometric:
PAw,s,Aℓ,s{Bw = i, Bℓ = j|B = n} =
(
Aw,s
i
)(
Aℓ,s
j
)(
Ns−Aw,s−Aℓ,s
n−i−j
)
(
Ns
n
) . (5)
The test statistic will be the diluted sample margin, D ≡ (Bw − Bℓ)/B.
This is the sample difference in the number of ballots for the winner and for
the loser, divided by the total number of ballots in the sample. We want to
test the compound hypothesis Aw,s−Aℓ,s ≤ c. The value of c is inferred from
the definition ωwℓ,s ≡ Vwℓ,s − Awℓ,s = Vw,s − Vℓ,s − (Aw,s − Aℓ,s). Thus,
c = Vw,s − Vℓ,s − ωwℓ,s = Vwℓ,s − λsVwℓ.
10Sampling with replacement leads to simpler arithmetic, but is not as efficient.
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The alternative is the compound hypothesis Aw,s − Aℓ,s > c.
11 Hence, we
will reject for large values of D. Conditional on B = n, the event D =
(Bw −Bℓ)/B = d is the event Bw − Bℓ = nd.
Suppose we observe D = d. The test will condition on the event B =
n. (In contrast, the BRAVO ballot-polling method (Lindeman et al., 2012)
conditions only on Bw +Bℓ = m.)
The p-value of the simple hypothesis that there are Aw,s ballots with a
vote for w but not for ℓ, Aℓ,s ballots with a vote for ℓ but not for w, and
N − Aw,s − Aℓ,s ballots with votes for both w and ℓ or neither w nor ℓ
(including undervotes and invalid ballots) is the sum of these probabilities
for events when Bw − Bℓ ≥ nd. Therefore,
PAw,s,Aℓ,s,Ns {D ≥ d | B = n} =
∑
(i,j):i,j≥0
i−j≥nd
i+j≤n
(
Aw,s
i
)(
Aℓ,s
j
)(
Ns−Aw,s−Aℓ,s
n−i−j
)
(
Ns
n
) . (6)
7.2 Conditional hypergeometric test
Another approach is to condition on both the events B = n and Bw+Bℓ = m.
We describe the hypothesis test here, but do not advocate for using it. We
found that this approach was inefficient in some simulation experiments.
Given B = n, all samples of size n from the ballots are equally likely, by
hypothesis. Hence, in particular, all samples of size n for which Bw+Bℓ = m
are equally likely. There are
(
Aw,s+Aℓ,s
m
)(
Ns−Aw,s−Aℓ,s
n−m
)
such samples. Among
these samples, Bw may take values i = 0, 1, . . . , m. For a fixed i, there are(
Aw,s
i
)(
Aℓ,s
m−i
)(
Ns−Aw,s−Aℓ,s
n−m
)
samples with Bw = i and Bℓ = m− i.
The factor
(
Ns−Aw,s−Aℓ,s
n−m
)
counts the number of ways to sample n − m
of the remaining ballots. If we divide out this factor, we simply count the
number of ways to sample ballots from the group of ballots for w or for ℓ.
There are
(
Aw,s+Aℓ,s
m
)
equally likely samples of size m from the ballots with
either a vote for w or for ℓ, but not both, and of these samples,
(
Aw,s
i
)(
Aℓ,s
m−i
)
contain i ballots with a vote for w but not ℓ. Therefore, conditional on B = n
and Bw +Bℓ = m, the probability that Bw = i is
11To use Wald’s Sequential Probability Ratio Test, we might pick a simple alternative
instead, e.g., Aw,s = Vw,s and Aℓ,s = Vℓ,s, the reported values, provided Vw,s − Vℓ,s > c.
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(
Aw,s
i
)(
Aℓ,s
m−i
)
(
Aw,s+Aℓ,s
m
) .
The p-value of the simple hypothesis that there are Aw,s ballots with a
vote for w but not for ℓ, Aℓ,s ballots with a vote for ℓ but not for w, and
N − Aw,s − Aℓ,s ballots with votes for both w and ℓ or neither w nor ℓ
(including undervotes and invalid ballots) is the sum of these probabilities
for events when Bw−Bℓ ≥ nd. This event occurs for Bw ≥
m+nd
2
. Therefore,
PAw,s,Aℓ,s,Ns {D ≥ d | B = n,Bw +Bℓ = m} =
min{m,Aw,s}∑
i=(m+nd)/2
(
Aw,s
i
)(
Aℓ,s
m−i
)
(
Aw,s+Aℓ,s
m
) . (7)
This conditional p-value is thus the tail probability of the hypergeomet-
ric distribution with parameters Aw,s “good” items, Aℓ,s “bad” items, and a
sample of size m. This calculation is numerically stable and fast; tail proba-
bilities of the hypergeometric distribution are available and well-tested in all
standard statistics software.
7.3 Maximizing the p-value over the null set
The composite null hypothesis does not specify Aw,s or Aℓ,s separately, only
that Aw,s − Aℓ,s ≤ c for some fixed, known c. The (conditional) p-value of
this composite hypothesis for D = d is the maximum p-value for all values
(Aw,s, Aℓ,s) that are possible under the null hypothesis,
max
Aw,s,Aℓ,s∈{0,1,...,N}:Aw,s−Aℓ,s≤c,Aw,s+Aℓ,s≤Ns
∑
(i,j):i,j≥0
i−j≥nd
i+j≤n
(
Aw,s
i
)(
Aℓ,s
j
)(
Ns−Aw,s−Aℓ,s
n−i−j
)
(
Ns
n
) ,
(8)
wherever the summand is defined. (Equivalently, define
(
m
k
)
≡ 0 if k > m,
k < 0, or m ≤ 0.)
7.3.1 Optimizing over the parameter c
The following result enables us to only test hypotheses along the boundary
of the null set.
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Theorem 1. Assume that n < Aw,s + Aℓ,s. Suppose the composite null
hypothesis is Nw −Nℓ ≤ c. The p-value is maximized on the boundary of the
null region, i.e. when Nw −Nℓ = c.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let c = 0 and assume that Au,s = Ns −
Aw,s−Aℓ,s is fixed. Let Nwℓ,s ≡ Aw,s+Aℓ,s be the fixed, unknown number of
ballots for w or for ℓ in stratum s. The p-value p0 for the simple hypothesis
that c = 0 is
p0 =
∑
(i,j):i,j≥0
i−j≥nd
i+j≤n
(
Nwℓ,s/2
i
)(
Nwℓ,s/2
j
)(
Au,s
n−i−j
)
(
Ns
n
) = ∑
(i,j):i,j≥0
i−j≥nd
i+j≤n
Tij , (9)
where Tij is defined as the (i, j) term in the summand and Tij ≡ 0 for
pairs (i, j) that don’t appear in the summation.
Assume that c > 0 is given. The p-value pc for this simple hypothesis is
pc =
∑
(i,j):i,j≥0
i−j≥nd
i+j≤n
(
(Nwℓ,s+c)/2
i
)(
(Nwℓ,s−c)/2
j
)(
Au,s
n−i−j
)
(
Ns
n
)
=
∑
(i,j):i,j≥0
i−j≥nd
i+j≤n
Tij
Nwℓ,s+c
2
(
Nwℓ,s+c
2
− 1) · · · (
Nwℓ,s
2
+ 1)(
Nwℓ,s−c
2
− j) · · · (
Nwℓ,s
2
− 1− j)
(
Nwℓ,s+c
2
− i) · · · (
Nwℓ,s
2
+ 1− i)(
Nwℓ,s−c
2
) · · · (
Nwℓ,s
2
− 1)
.
Terms in the fraction can be simplified: choose the corresponding pairs
in the numerator and denominator. Fractions of the form
Nwℓ,s
2
+a
Nwℓ,s
2
+a−i
can be
expressed as 1 + iNwℓ,s
2
+a−i
. Fractions of the form
Nwℓ,s
2
−a−j
Nwℓ,s
2
−a
can be expressed
as 1− jNwℓ,s
2
−a
. Thus, the p-value can be written as
21
pc =
∑
(i,j):i,j≥0
i−j≥nd
i+j≤n
Tij
c/2∏
a=1
(
1 +
i
Nwℓ,s
2
+ a− i
)(
1−
j
Nwℓ,s
2
− a
)
>
∑
(i,j):i,j≥0
i−j≥nd
i+j≤n
Tij
[(
1 +
i
Nwℓ,s+c
2
− i
)(
1−
j
Nwℓ,s
2
+ 1
)]c/2
=
∑
(i,j):i,j≥0
i−j≥nd
i+j≤n
Tij
[
1 +
Nwℓ,s+c
2
j +
Nwℓ,s
2
i+ i
(
Nwℓ,s+c
2
− i)(
Nwℓ,s
2
+ 1)
]c/2
>
∑
(i,j):i,j≥0
i−j≥nd
i+j≤n
Tij
= p0
The last inequality follows from the fact that i and j are nonnegative,
and that i <
Nwℓ,s+c
2
– it is a possible outcome under the null hypothesis.
7.3.2 Optimizing over the parameter Aw,s
We have shown empirically (but do not prove) that this tail probability, as a
function of Aw,s, has a unique maximum at one of the endpoints when Aw,s
is either as small or as large as possible, given N , c, and the observed sample
values Bw and Bℓ. If the empirical result is true, then finding the maximum
is trivial; otherwise, it is a trivial one-dimensional optimization problem to
compute the unconditional p-value.
7.4 Conditional testing
If the conditional tests are always conducted at significance level α or less,
i.e., so that P{Type I error|B = n} ≤ α, then the overall procedure has
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significance level α or less:
P{Type I error} =
N∑
n=0
{Type I error|B = n}P{B = n}
≤
N∑
n=0
αP{B = n} = α. (10)
In particular, this implies that our conditional hypergeometric test will
have the correct risk limit unconditionally.
8 Recommendations
We have outlined several methods Colorado might use to audit cross-jurisdictional
contests that include CVR counties and no-CVR counties. We expect that
stratified “hybrid” audits will be the most palatable, given the constraints
on time for software development and the logistics of the audit itself, because
the workflow for counties would be the same as it was in November, 2017.
What would change is the risk calculation “behind the scene,” including
the algorithms used to decide when the audit can stop. Those algorithms
could be implemented in software external to RLATool. The minimal modi-
fication to RLATool that would be required to conduct a hybrid audit is to
allow the sample size from each county to be controlled externally, e.g. by
uploading a parameter file once per round, rather than using a formula that
is based on the margin within that county alone. The parameter file would
be generated by external software that does the audit calculations described
here based on the detailed audit progress and discrepancy data available from
RLATools’ rla export command.
To conduct a hybrid audit, one must choose two numbers in addition to
the risk limit α:
• one stratum-wise risk limit, α1 (the other, α2, is determined from α1
and the overall risk limit, α)
• the tradeoff (allocation) of the tolerable overstatement between strata,
λ1 (the value of λ2 is 1− λ1)
Those parameters can be chosen essentially arbitrarily (provided α1 ≤ α) and
the audit will still be risk-limiting; however, they can be optimized to reduce
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the expected workload under various assumptions about tabulation errors in
the two strata. (Software that can be used to run scenarios is available at h
ttps://www.github.com/pbstark/CORLA18; see below.)
In either stratum, increasing the risk limit or increasing the tolerable
overstatement will decrease the required sample size from that stratum (as-
suming that the actual overstatement in that stratum is less than its allow-
able overstatement). The relative change in sample size as the risk limit
changes scales similarly in the two strata, because the risk limit enters both
ballot-level comparisons and ballot-polling the same way: as the logarithm.
However, the relative change in sample sizes as the tolerable overstatement
changes scales quite differently in the two strata: linearly in the ballot-level
comparison stratum, but quadratically in the ballot-polling stratum. Hence,
the workload is not as sensitive to how the risk limit is allocated across strata
as it is to how the tolerable overstatement is allocated.
8.1 Software and examples
Examples of stratified hybrid audits are in Jupyter notebooks available at
https://www.github.com/pbstark/CORLA18. The first two examples are
contained in a single notebook, “hybrid-audit-example-1”. The first example
is a hypothetical medium-sized election with a total of 110, 000 votes and a
diluted margin of 1.8%. 9.1% of the ballots come from no-CVR counties.
The risk limit is 10%. If the audit in the CVR stratum found no errors and
the allowable overstatement error was 30% of the margin, it would terminate
after examining 1,213 ballots. In over 90% of 10,000 simulations, an audit
of 250 ballots from the no-CVR stratum would have sufficed to confirm that
the overstatement error in that stratum did not exceed its allocation, 70% of
the margin. A sample of 450 ballots was sufficient to stop the audit in 99%
of simulations. As always, λ1 could be adjusted to rebalance the expected
workload between strata, perhaps taking into account the expected workload
for audits of countywide or intra-county contests, so as to minimize (or quite
possibly eliminate) any additional burden imposed by the stratified audit.
If a CVR were available for all counties and we could have run a ballot-
level comparison audit for the entire contest, rather than stratifying, an audit
with risk limit 10% that found no errors would have concluded after exam-
ining just 263 ballots. The efficiency gained comes from two sources. First,
ballot-level comparison audits are substantially more efficient than ballot-
polling audits. Second, the hybrid audit requires dividing the margin and
24
risk limit between two strata. This results in both strata using smaller risk
limits. In order to keep the workload low, it is necessary to allocate a dispro-
portionately high fraction of the margin to the no-CVR stratum; the CVR
stratum must increase its workload to compensate.
Another method discussed in Section 2.3 is to perform a ballot-level com-
parison audit statewide, but to treat any ballot sampled from the no-CVR
county as showing a two-vote overstatement. In this example, this worst-
case method would lead to a full hand count. However, the situation may be
more optimistic for Colorado: if only 1.2% of ballots came from the no-CVR
stratum and the overall margin were in fact 10,000 votes, then this method
would require checking 430 ballots.
The second example is a hypothetical large statewide election with a to-
tal of 2 million ballots and a diluted margin of nearly 20%. The risk limit is
5%. If the audit in the CVR stratum found no errors and the allowable over-
statement error was 10% of the margin, it would terminate after examining
50 ballots. In over 90% of 10,000 simulations, an audit of 50 ballots from
the no-CVR stratum would have sufficed to confirm that the overstatement
error in that stratum did not exceed its allocation, 90% of the margin. A
sample of 100 ballots was sufficient to stop the audit in 99% of simulations.
If a CVR were available for all counties and we could have run a ballot-level
comparison audit for the entire contest, rather than stratifying, an audit with
risk limit 5% that found no errors would have concluded after examining just
24 ballots.
A second notebook, “hybrid-audit-example-2,” illustrates the workflow
for conducting a hybrid audit of this kind. The example election has a total
of 2 million ballots. The reported margin is just over 1%, but in reality the
vote totals for the reported winner and reported loser are identical in both
strata. The risk limit is 5%. The example illustrates two scenarios. In the
first scenario, the audit in the CVR stratum escalates to a full hand count and
the allowable overstatement in the no-CVR stratum must be adjusted. Using
the new allowable overstatement in the no-CVR stratum makes it impossible
to terminate the audit, even for samples as large as 5% of the ballots. In the
second scenario, the audit in the no-CVR stratum terminates with a sample
of 500 ballots. However, the audit in the CVR stratum will still lead to a
full hand count and the audit in the no-CVR stratum must be redone using
the adjusted allowable overstatement, putting us back in the first scenario.
In both cases, the audit leads to a full recount of all the ballots.
These notebooks can be modified and run with different contest sizes,
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margins, risk limits, and allocations of allowable error, in order to estimate
the workload of different scenarios.
References
J.H. Ban˜uelos and P.B. Stark. Limiting risk by turning manifest phantoms
into evil zombies. Technical report, arXiv.org, 2012. URL http://arxiv
.org/abs/1207.3413. Retrieved 17 July 2012.
J. Benaloh, D. Jones, E. Lazarus, M. Lindeman, and P.B. Stark. SOBA:
Secrecy-preserving observable ballot-level audits. In Proceedings of the
2011 Electronic Voting Technology Workshop / Workshop on Trustworthy
Elections (EVT/WOTE ’11). USENIX, 2011. URL http://statistics.
berkeley.edu/~stark/Preprints/soba11.pdf.
Geoffrey R. Grimmett and David R. Stirzaker. Probability and Random
Processes. Oxford University Press, August 2001. ISBN 0198572220.
URL http://www.amazon.ca/exec/obidos/redirect?tag=citeulike0
9-20&amp;path=ASIN/0198572220.
M. Lindeman, P.B. Stark, and V. Yates. BRAVO: Ballot-polling risk-limiting
audits to verify outcomes. In Proceedings of the 2011 Electronic Voting
Technology Workshop / Workshop on Trustworthy Elections (EVT/WOTE
’11). USENIX, to appear 2012.
Mark Lindeman and Philip B. Stark. A gentle introduction to risk-limiting
audits. IEEE Security and Privacy, 10:42–49, 2012.
Ronald L. Rivest. Bayesian tabulation audits: Explained and extended,
January 1, 2018. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1801.00528.
P.B. Stark. Conservative statistical post-election audits. Ann. Appl. Stat.,
2:550–581, 2008. URL http://arxiv.org/abs/0807.4005.
P.B. Stark. Risk-limiting post-election audits: P -values from common prob-
ability inequalities. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Se-
curity, 4:1005–1014, 2009a.
P.B. Stark. Auditing a collection of races simultaneously. Technical report,
arXiv.org, 2009b. URL http://arxiv.org/abs/0905.1422v1.
P.B. Stark. Super-simple simultaneous single-ballot risk-limiting audits.
In Proceedings of the 2010 Electronic Voting Technology Workshop /
Workshop on Trustworthy Elections (EVT/WOTE ’10). USENIX, 2010.
URL http://www.usenix.org/events/evtwote10/tech/full_papers/
Stark.pdf.
Philip B. Stark and Vanessa Teague. Verifiable european elections: Risk-
limiting audits for d’hondt and its relatives. JETS: USENIX Journal of
Election Technology and Systems, 3.1, 2014. URL https://www.usenix.
org/jets/issues/0301/stark.
Philip B. Stark and David A. Wagner. Evidence-based elections. IEEE
Security and Privacy, 10:33–41, 2012.
A. Wald. Sequential tests of statistical hypotheses. Ann. Math. Stat., 16:
117–186, 1945.
27
